The Hotline mailbag publishes each Friday. Send questions to [email protected] and include ‘mailbag’ in the subject line. Or hit me on Twitter: @WilnerHotline.
Please note: Some questions have been edited for clarity and brevity.
In theory, sure. The conferences should explore all available routes to counteract the Big Ten and SEC as they consolidate power.
The Hotline felt that way about the Pac-12 and the Big 12 years ago and suggested a scheduling alliance that would have provided strength in numbers.
We wouldn’t be surprised to hear the ACC and Big 12 have held informal discussions about ways they can work together and use scale to unlock value in non-conference matchups.
But an outright merger? In our view, it’s impractical for a variety of reasons:
— Florida State, Clemson and North Carolina are loath to be locked into any new agreements, unless those deals are with the Big Ten or SEC.
— An outright merger would assuredly require the ACC to rip up the grant-of-rights agreement that binds the schools together, thus creating an escape hatch for the Seminoles and others.
— How would it benefit Fox and ESPN? True, the networks have been working together recently — the announcement of a joint streaming platform (with Warner Bros. Discovery) is hard evidence of a thaw.
But they already have cut-rate deals: ESPN and Fox have a combined agreement with the Big 12 into 2031, while ESPN is all-in with the ACC until 2036.
The conferences would only agree to merge if it meant more revenue. Why would ESPN and Fox agree to pay more? If anything, the trajectory of media rights suggests consolidation, not expansion.
As the cable bundle shrinks, dollars become sparse. At the same time, the value of premier college football matchups continues to rise. ESPN and Fox have shown a willingness to pay billions for big brands in the SEC and Big Ten. They aren’t going to pay one cent more to acquire the long-haul rights to Texas Tech vs. Virginia Tech, or UCF vs. Boston College.
If Big 12 commissioner Brett Yormark and ACC commissioner Jim Phillips can find common ground on scheduling partnerships for football or men’s basketball, there might be an incremental revenue lift.
But we are skeptical of any scenario in which an outright merger would create more value for the conferences. In fact, it would devastate the ACC by providing its top brands with an exit route.
Which of the two leagues is third in the college football hierarchy and which is fourth? It doesn’t matter. In a few years, the gap between the Big 12/SEC and the Big 12/ACC will be as large as the gap between the Big 12/ACC and the Group of Five/’Pac-2′ is now.
They are correct. The final offer from Apple was an all-streaming deal for $25 million guaranteed (per school) and revenue escalators starting in Year 3 that would have been well within reach.
That said, the Pac-12 could have taken slightly less in guaranteed cash ($23 million) in exchange for Apple and the conference sub-licensing games on linear networks — an arrangement comparable to Apple’s deal with Major League Soccer.
Could you argue that partnering with the world’s most influential and creative company was the right move for the long haul, especially given the likelihood that Apple will increase its presence in the sports media space? Absolutely. (And the Hotline did exactly that prior to the Pac-12’s collapse.)
But you could also make the case that the schools needed more guaranteed revenue and access to linear TV (primarily through ESPN and Fox) to remain competitive.
One aspect of the proposal is beyond dispute:
Kliavkoff completely misread the room in assuming his presidents and athletic directors would embrace a media deal rooted in revenue projections and subscription goals given the deep, lasting scars from the Pac-12 Networks’ failed business model.
It was just another example of the disconnect between Kliavkoff and his campuses.
The specifics of the TV contract have not been made public, so we are unaware of appearance minimums (or maximums) on Friday nights.
Details will emerge this spring, when the conference releases the kickoff times for the early-season games and announces which scheduled matchups will move to Fridays.
But the following seems likely:
— Ohio State and Michigan won’t play more than once on Friday, if at all.
TV viewership is much larger on Saturdays than on Friday nights. Fox, NBC and CBS won’t waste their ratings behemoths in a window with limited scope.
Also, those two schools have enough influence within the Big Ten to refuse to play on short weeks for competitive purposes.
— Oregon and Washington likely will have more Friday games than other schools.
According to multiple sources, Fox bid on a portion of Pac-12 inventory — it was part of a larger linear deal cobbled together by Kliavkoff — that would have paid about $60 million annually for a series of Friday games.
When Washington and Oregon sought an escape hatch, Fox simply shifted that money to the Big Ten and used it to fund membership for the two schools as their annual distributions.
Presumably, Fox will want several Friday appearances from the Ducks and Huskies in return.
We can’t help but notice the conference closest to the NCAA ideal of amateurism, the Ivy League, is playing such an impactful role in forcing the association to abandon its model.
The National Labor Relations Board’s decision earlier this week clears a path “for an election that would create the first labor union for NCAA athletes,” according to the Associated Press report.
While significant as a standalone development, the move should be viewed in combination with another NLRB case: The complaint against USC, the Pac-12 and the NCAA, filed last spring, that attempts to define athletes as employees.
The USC complaint is potentially more damaging to the college amateurism model because of the joint nature of the filing. To this point, the NLRB’s jurisdiction has been limited to private employers, as we saw with Northwestern’s unionization efforts years ago. By combining the Pac-12 and NCAA, which have public schools under their purview, the board is attempting to have athletes at both private and public schools declared employees.
Our suggestion: Both cases are important, and if they don’t succeed, there will be future NLRB filings elsewhere.
The Hotline’s official position is that no single school should be blamed for the demise of the conference. Years of poor leadership created the circumstances for collapse. Responsibility lies with the presidents and commissioners in charge since the early 2010s, not a particular school.
Also, we published a summary of culpability in October (in Murder on the Orient Express style) that details how each of the 10 departing universities played a role in the Pac-12’s demise.
Of the three you mentioned, USC’s actions had the greatest impact — and it’s not close. Had the Trojans stayed in the conference through the negotiating window for media rights, the Pac-12 would have remained intact.
The same could be said, to a lesser degree, of UW: Had the Huskies accepted the all-in deal with Apple presented by Kliavkoff in early August, a grant-of-rights agreement would have been signed by the nine schools still committed at that point. But UW found the Apple proposal suboptimal.
Why was it suboptimal? Because the Pac-12 had lost the L.A. media market when USC and UCLA departed the previous summer.
Why did they leave? Because of years of mismanagement by the presidents and commissioners.
Here’s our view, in a nutshell:
The ‘Pac-2’ schools should hold out for anything they can get — make the process as difficult as possible for everyone else, essentially — because in the end, WSU and OSU are going to get the shortest straw available.
The future of the CFP, as defined by format and revenue distribution, will be all about the SEC and Big Ten, with the ACC and Big 12 in secondary positions and the ‘Pac-2’ and Group of Five a distant third.
Remember, there is no playoff for 2026 and beyond. The expansion format announced in September is for the 2024 and 2025 seasons — the final two subject to the CFP’s original contract with ESPN.
For all we know, the SEC and Big Ten will dictate terms for the next edition and, if they don’t get exactly what they want, create their own event.
So Schulz is smart to play hardball. There’s no upside to acquiescing.
I’m not sure Chun’s appointment will have a material impact on Washington State or Oregon State next season, or in 2025. But it undoubtedly helps with optics.
In his position, Chun will provide a continual reminder that the conference exists — not only in the selection committee meetings but also in the public sphere through media reports.
Any listing of, or reference to committee members will include his name and attachment to WSU and, therefore, the ‘Pac-2’.
In our view, staying relevant, not generating revenue, will be the most daunting challenge for the Cougars and Beavers in coming seasons.
Short of winning every game through the semifinals of the Pac-12 tournament, the Bruins have no chance to make the NCAA at-large field. I’m not sure why this topic has any juice on social media, frankly.
The Bruins have horrific metrics:
— They are No. 117 in the NET rankings, far from the range generally considered safe for the at-large field (top 40).
— They are 0-6 in Quadrant I results (bad) and have four losses to Quadrant III and IV opponents (worse).
— And their non-conference schedule, No. 195 in the Pomeroy ratings, won’t help matters.
The Hotline has taken a rosier view of UCLA than most in the college basketball media. Early last week, in fact, we wrote the following:
“Combine the notable uptick in success (and confidence) with the manageable upcoming schedule and the Bruins could very well claim one of the top four seeds in Las Vegas. Seriously.”
But the NCAAs? Not as an at-large team. No way.
Hopefully, some context will help.
Texas was No. 7 on my AP ballot before the Big 12 title game, largely as a result of a tepid view of the Big 12’s overall competitive strength. And I saw no reason to elevate the Longhorns after their victory in the conference championship over a three-loss team (Oklahoma State) that was battered by UCF.
Nor did I feel compelled to move the Longhorns up after their loss to Washington in the semifinals.
Their position in my early top 25 for next season is based on roster presumptions and could change when the rankings are updated after spring practice.
But generally, I’m skeptical of their prospects next season in the SEC. It feels like a three-loss season, which translates to a ranking in the 10-to-15 range.
I have nothing against UT. In fact, fans of other schools have roasted me repeatedly this season for ranking the Longhorns too high on my AP men’s basketball ballot.
The Hotline typically does not publish candidate lists for jobs before they become vacant, out of respect for the sitting head coach.
We will examine the pool of candidates for the Huskies if they move on from Hopkins. That seems likely, as we outlined earlier this week in our Hot Seat assessment.
Hopkins has one year remaining on his $3 million annual deal — not an exorbitant amount by any means.
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